This paper demonstrates that a pollution tax with a …xed cost component may lead, by itself, to strati…cation between clean and dirty …rms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where pollution is a by-product of dirty good manufacturing. Under proper assumptions, a completely strati…ed con…guration with all dirty …rms clustering in one city emerges as the only equilibrium outcome when there is a …xed cost component of the pollution tax. Moreover, a strati…ed Pareto optimum can never be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium with a linear pollution tax that encompasses Pigouvian taxation as a special case. To support such a strati…ed Pareto optimum, however, an e¤ective but unconventional policy prescription is to redistribute the pollution tax revenue from the dirty to the clean city residents. JEL Classi…cation: D62, H23, R13.
Introduction
It is evident that the development of many local economies has featured adjacent but separate clean and dirty cities. Examples of such pairs include Seattle/Tacoma and San Francisco/Oakland with larger clean cities, Ann Arbor/Detroit and Aurora/Denver with smaller clean cities, as well as Washington, D.C./Baltimore with comparably sized clean and dirty cities. A natural question arises: Why are dirty …rms clustered in one location and why is such an outcome sustainable over time? Certainly one might address the question with heterogeneity in preferences or increasing returns in production, for example internal increasing returns of the type used in the New Economic Geography literature; see the recent paper by Picard and Tabuchi (2010) and papers cited therein. 1 Our paper proposes an alternative: a pollution tax with a …xed cost tax component may, by itself, lead to strati…cation between clean and dirty …rms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns.
Since 1972, the OECD has adopted the polluter pays principle, trying to internalize environmental costs based on the idea …rst advanced by Pigou (1920) . More recently, the OECD (1994) categorized three types of pollution taxes: (i) a proportional tax on the actual pollution output, for example according to the amount of emission; (ii) a proportional tax on a proxy for pollution output, for example according to water consumption, electricity usage or each unit of product when the production process harms the environment; and (iii) a …xed cost tax levied on each company or each household. In this paper, we consider all three types. Whereas a …xed cost tax levied on each …rm is considered, the proportional Pigouvian tax is generalized to a linear tax that includes a …xed cost tax component as proposed by Carlton and Loury (1980 Porter (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of industrial clustering from a business strategy viewpoint. Our paper is also related to the locational strati…cation literature, where strati…cation is caused by human capital (cf.
Benabou 1996a,b, Chen, Peng and Wang 2009), local public goods (cf. Nachyba 1997 and Peng and Wang 2005) , and the environment (cf. Chen, Huang and Wang 2012). 2 See also Baumol (1972) and Buchanan and Tullock (1975) on direct control versus taxation, and Chipman and Tian (2012) on markets for rights to pollute in an aspatial context. While there is an existing literature on the welfare consequences of pollution taxation (see citations in Section 7 below), none explores the implication of pollution In brief, the purpose of this paper is as follows. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where pollution is a by-product of dirty good manufacturing, and dirty good manufacturing is subject to agglomeration externalities with decreasing private returns to scale. We could obtain our results without agglomeration externalities, but they help simplify the analysis and calculations, as we shall explain below. Next, we establish conditions under which a completely strati…ed con…guration with all dirty …rms clustering in one city emerges as the only equilibrium outcome when there is a …xed cost component of the pollution tax. Finally, we
show that a strati…ed Pareto optimum can never be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium under a linear pollution tax without redistributing the pollution tax revenue from the dirty to the clean city residents.
Regarding our examples of pairs of clean and dirty cities in the US, it is important to point out from where, in our view, the …xed component of a pollution tax arises. As discussed by Karp (2005, pp. 229-230), if …rms pay a unit tax based on the aggregate level of pollution, in technical terms an "ambient tax," but if they think that they are so small that they have no e¤ect on the aggregate level of pollution, then they view the tax as a …xed cost. 3 Of course, such an ambient tax may vary by location, as aggregate pollution is generally location-speci…c. Such a tax is essentially an aggregate amount of required revenue (the tax rate multiplied by total pollution) divided up among …rms in the local polluting industry, which is exactly the way we model it. 4 Our main result establishes that taxing pollution with a …xed component independent of dirty good output can cause …rm agglomeration (a variable tax component on top of the …xed component is permitted). The key argument is as follows. At a symmetric, integrated equilibrium, wages equalize both across sectors and locations. Then, in the presence of a …xed total pollution damage payment in each polluted region, dirty factories may not have su¢cient pro…tability to pay the tax and thus no integrated equilibrium exists. Now if dirty …rms cluster, as they do in a strati…ed equilibrium, then they share the …xed pollution tax in the one region where they cluster, implying higher net of tax pro…t. Moreover, wage equalization between the two locations is no longer required in equilibrium because clean and dirty …rms are in two di¤erent locations, so there is no wage equalization even taxation for production agglomeration, in particular when pollution is local (so location is relevant) and agents are mobile. The point of Carlton and Loury (1980) is di¤erent, in that they are concerned with …rm entry and exit. We do not consider that in our model. 3 Karp (2005) goes on to consider the case where …rms are large so each has an e¤ect on the aggregate level of pollution. 4 A natural alternative model, that does not capture this idea, is to use a …xed lump-sum tax for each …rm entering the local market. This would clearly not be: an ambient tax with a large number of …rms.
across sectors. All we need is utility equalization, which only requires that pollution disutility balance with the wage di¤erential. This is consistent with …rm pro…tability under strati…cation.
The important part of the argument is as follows. Both the …xed component of the pollution tax and decreasing private returns are needed for this result, as indicated above. The …xed component of the pollution tax rules out integrated equilibrium. With decreasing private returns that permit positive rent for dirty …rms, agglomeration ensures enough pro…tability of dirty …rms when fully clustered to allow existence of strati…ed equilibrium with the tax. There is a positive feedback loop: With a variable tax component, more pollution in a region implies more tax revenue that attracts more worker/consumers (who receive the revenue), thus depressing the wage. A potential o¤setting factor is that the wage must be higher in the region to compensate for disutility due to more pollution. In the end, the equilibrium con…guration is a function of the parameters.
The key di¤erence between this work and the classical literature on Pigouvian taxation is: We assume that there is a local government in each region that must balance its own budget. We take the tax system of each local government to be exogenous and uniform, with no tax competition. 5 The taxes could be set by a higher level of government. But the revenues stay local. For example, the tax revenues could pass through a higher level of government and be returned to the local government in some form such as funding for a local public good. In other words, we are making an important distinction between the authority that sets the tax on pollution, and the recipients of the revenue.
There are 3 related potential distortions in our framework: a negative pollution externality from dirty …rm production imposed on consumers, a positive local agglomeration externality for polluting …rms, and a migration incentive for consumers induced by the tax and redistribution schedules in the two regions. Regarding the last distortion, local tax revenue and local pro…ts are distributed back to the residents of that location only. The setting would be classical if there were only one national government with the power to tax di¤erentially and redistribute to consumers independent of region of residence. In that case, the standard welfare theorems would go through under Pigouvian taxes, since correction for the pollution externality and migration incentives (the …rst and third distortions) can be made in the usual way, whereas the …xed cost component of the …rm tax/transfer system can account for the agglomeration externality. However, with independent regional government taxation as in our setting, equilibrium allocations might not be Pareto optimal unless transfers between the regional governments are made so that the regional governments can 5 The reader is referred to Markusen, Morey, and Oleviler (1995) for modeling …scal competition in pollution taxes with …rms choosing the location of plants.
mimic a national government.
Turning next to a detailed description of our model, to illustrate the possibility that a pollution tax causes agglomeration of dirty …rms, we construct a simple model featuring two industries, clean and dirty. Both industries use homogeneous labor as inputs. Whereas the clean service production is Ricardian (constant returns), dirty manufactured good production is socially constant-returnsto-scale and privately diminishing returns with positive spillovers of the Romer type. Pollution is a by-product of dirty good manufacturing. To eliminate unnecessary complications associated with a wealth e¤ect, utility is assumed to be quasi-linear, linear in clean good consumption and pollution but strictly increasing and strictly concave in dirty good consumption. The pollution tax schedule features a …xed cost tax component that is independent of pollution (or dirty good output) and may also contain a marginal tax component that is proportional to dirty good output.
We establish that under proper assumptions, a completely strati…ed equilibrium with all dirty …rms clustered in one city is supported and such a strati…ed equilibrium cannot emerge in the absence of the …xed payment pollution tax. In some circumstances, an integrated equilibrium is impossible, but a strati…ed equilibrium exists. Under suitable conditions, we show that the presence of pollution and a pollution tax with a …xed cost tax component, rather than the Romer-type positive spillovers, are necessary for agglomeration of dirty …rms. Our main …ndings are robust, and remain valid even when: (i) quasi-linearity of utility is abandoned, or (ii) allowing producers to choose between clean and dirty good technologies. We have assumptions on the model's reduced form that will generate either integrated or strati…ed equilibrium. We do not push them back to primitives, as there are many exogenous parameters and thus many combinations that will work for each type of con…guration. However, in Remarks 6 and 7 below, we …x all but 2 parameters and provide a description of parameter ranges where the respective equilibrium con…gurations arise.
Next we turn to the examination of Pareto optima. Depending on exogenous parameter values, both integrated and strati…ed con…gurations can arise as optima. Whereas an integrated Pareto optimum can be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium with a linear pollution tax, a strati…ed Pareto optimum cannot. Speci…cally, regardless of the linear pollution tax schedule, a strati…ed equilibrium is always over-polluted compared to the optimum. To support the strati…ed Pareto optimum, one must redistribute pollution tax revenues from the dirty to the clean city residents. This suggests a new instrument to rectify competitive equilibrium ine¢ciency when there is pollution generated by dirty good production. 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the notation and basic model. Section 3 provides …rst order necessary conditions for equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the two types of equilibria we consider here, namely integrated and strati…ed. Section 5 analyzes the conditions on parameters that generate each of these types of equilibria. Section 6 gives further results, particularly about stability of equilibrium, that can be derived with speci…c functional forms, namely an example. Section 7 discusses Pareto optima and the welfare theorems, whereas section 8 concludes.
The Model
Consider a local economy consisting of two regions/cities (i = A; B) and two sectors (a clean/service good X and a dirty/manufactured good Y ). Each region has an abundant supply of land of density one in a featureless landscape. Land is omitted from the benchmark model for tractability reasons, so the model looks more like one of coalition formation than of an urban economy. Goods are freely mobile and there is no cost to transport any commodity between regions. Throughout the paper, the clean good is taken as the numéraire.
This local economy is populated with three groups of active agents: (i) a continuum of households of a …xed mass one, who are all both consumers and workers; (ii) a continuum of clean (nonpolluting) …rms of mass one, and (iii) a continuum of dirty (polluting) …rms of mass M > 0. All households are freely mobile between the two regions, but once a household has chosen a residential location, it cannot commute between the two regions. This latter assumption is equivalent to assuming that the commuting cost between two regions is su¢ciently high. Such an assumption is justi…able when the two regions are su¢ciently far apart: for many clean-dirty city pairs in the real world such as Ann Arbor-Detroit and Seattle-Tacoma, the fraction of people commuting between cities is essentially negligible. We will discuss in Section 5.1 (see Remark 4) what happens if workers are allowed to commute between the two regions.
In addition to the three groups of active agents, there is a local government ruling each region, whose only activity is to collect pollution taxes/fees for redistribution to consumers. To close the economy, we shall assume that dirty …rms in a particular region are owned by consumers in the same region.
We relegate the discussion of other possible con…gurations to the concluding section.
Firms
The clean good is produced with labor input under a Ricardian technology,
where x i (j) denotes the output of clean …rm j in location i, > 0 is the inverse of the unit labor requirement for clean good production, n i x (j) represents clean …rm j's demand for labor, and k i 2 [0; 1] denotes the mass of clean …rms in region i. The total local supply of the clean good in region i is given by X i = Z k i 0 x i (j)dj and the total local clean industry employees in the region i can be speci…ed as:
Under ex post symmetry of …rms in a region, imposed throughout, we have N i x = k i n i x . Denote by m i the mass of dirty …rms in region i, by n i y (j) the labor demand by a dirty …rm j in region i, and by N i y the total local dirty industry employees in region i, where:
Each dirty good …rm employs labor as the sole private input under a privately decreasing-returnsto-scale and socially constant-returns-to-scale production technology e f :
where y i (j) is the output of dirty …rm j in region i. We assume that e f is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each argument, satisfying the boundary condition e f 0; N i y = 0 and the Inada conditions lim n i y (j)!0 Both goods (clean and dirty) are traded and freely mobile. Let p denote the global relative price of the dirty good. Further denote the wage rate prevailing in region i as w i . Let the region-speci…c pollution tax in region i be i (to be speci…ed later), where i p represents a typical ad valorem tax. 7 Each dirty …rm in region i chooses labor demand to maximize its pro…t; its optimization problem is then given by:
The aggregate output of the dirty good in region i is
Households
Each household values the consumption of the clean good and the dirty good but su¤ers disutility from pollution. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor. Since a household does not value leisure, the entire one unit of labor is supplied inelastically. Let Q i measure the level of pollution in region i. Following conventional wisdom, we assume that pollution is a by-product of the production of dirty goods, taking a simple linear form:
where > 0. The utility of a household residing in region i takes a quasi-linear form:
This utility function is quasi-linear in the spirit of Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) : linear in clean good consumption c x and total pollution Q, but nonlinear in c y , as u(c y ) is the utility obtained from consuming the dirty good. It is strictly increasing and strictly concave, satisfying the boundary condition u(0) = 0 and the Inada conditions lim c i y !0 u 0 (c i y ) = 1 and lim c i y !1 u 0 (c i y ) = 0. The household's budget constraint in region i is simply speci…ed as follows:
where z i represents the sum of government rebates (of pollution tax collection) and …rm pro…t redistribution in region i:
Quasi-linear preferences imply that, by substituting in the budget constraint (8), household's utility can be rewritten as:
which is income net of pollution disutility plus the consumer surplus derived from consuming the dirty good. Thus, household's optimization reduces to one variable: maximization of the consumer surplus from dirty good consumption, which simpli…es the analysis greatly. We will discuss in Section 5.1 (see Remark 3) what happens if the utility of the clean good is strictly concave.
The Local Government
The pollution tax levies on the dirty …rm are given as follows:
When pollution is nondegenerate, we shall consider two speci…c regimes of interest, namely, a …xed pollution tax regime and a linear pollution tax regime: 8 Under the …xed pollution tax regime, a …xed levy F > 0 is imposed on region i so that each …rm pays an equal share F m i ; under the linear pollution tax regime, in addition to a lump-sum tax L > 0, a marginal tax t > 0 is imposed on …rm output y i . Whereas the former can best illustrate the role of pollution taxation played in …rm agglomeration, the latter is important because it encompasses Pigouvian taxation as a special case and allows practical welfare analysis. For notational convenience, we shall denote generally the marginal tax rate as:
0, under …xed pollution tax regime t, under linear pollution tax regime
Optimization and Equilibrium
We are now prepared to derive individual optimizing conditions and to specify market clearing conditions.
Optimization
The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization of each clean and dirty …rm is, respectively, given by:
where V M P L denotes the value of the marginal product of labor (or marginal revenue product) and M P L denotes the marginal product of labor. Denote the dirty …rm's surplus accrued from uncompensated spillovers as:
It is convenient to denote the dirty …rm's surplus excluding pollution tax as e (e) = f (e) ef 0 (e) : Given our assumptions on the production function for dirty …rms, both (e) and e (e) are strictly increasing in e. Substituting the ex post symmetry condition, N i y = m i n i y as well as (11) and (3) into (5) yields the pro…t for every …rm j in region i:
The lump-sum distribution to each household follows immediately:
The household's optimization problem can be written more simply in two steps, solving backward.
In the second step, households choose their best consumption bundle subject to their budget in each region. In the …rst step, they choose their region of residence.
Beginning with the second step, each household residing in region i maximizes their utility subject to the budget constraint by choosing c i y :
The …rst-order condition of (14) with respect to c i y is given by:
It is immediate that, since the relative price of the dirty good across the two regions is one, the consumption of the dirty good in the two regions must be identical too. From the budget constraint (8) and (15), we then solve the clean good consumption as:
Substituting (11), (13) , and (15) into (16), we have the consumption of the clean good in region i as:
In the …rst step, the household's residential location can be determined by:
Market Clearance
Denote region i's labor supply as N i and recall that total labor supply is normalized to one (the total measure of consumers). The regional and overall labor market clearing conditions are thus:
Moreover, goods market clearing conditions are:
By symmetry, we have:
where
Finally, if both locations are occupied, locational equilibrium requires:
Equilibrium Con…guration
A competitive spatial equilibrium is a tuple of quantities, fn i x (j); n i y (j); N i x ; N i y ; N i ; k i ; m i ; c i x ; c i y ; x i (j); y i (j); Q i g, and prices, fw i ; pg, such that: (i) all households and …rms optimize; (ii) labor markets clear; (iii) goods markets clear; (iv) the population identity holds; and (v) the locational equilibrium condition is met. 9 Among all possible equilibrium con…gurations, we are particularly interested in 9 The equilibrium concept is based on the multi-class equilibrium concept constructed by Hartwick, Schweizer and Varaiya (1976). two equilibria: The …rst type is an integrated equilibrium where all clean and dirty …rms are spread symmetrically over the two regions so that both types of …rms are completely integrated locationally. The second type is a strati…ed equilibrium where all dirty manufacturing …rms agglomerate in one region (without loss of generality, let it be region A) and all clean service …rms are located in region B (where workers face better environmental conditions). In order to compare the endogenous variables obtained under the two types of equilibria, we shall use arguments I and S to denote integrated and strati…ed patterns, respectively.
Case I: Integrated Equilibrium
In an integrated equilibrium, both …rms and households are symmetrically distributed across the two regions. Thus, we have:
Moreover, wages must be equalized between the clean and the dirty sectors in each region. From (10) and (11), we can thus depict in Figure 1 the labor allocation between clean and dirty sectors under the integrated equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 1 illustrates that dirty …rms' labor demand, which is a downward-sloping function of n i y =N i y , is determined by wage equalization between the clean and the dirty sectors (see point E I ), namely where:
which determines the relative price of the dirty good as a decreasing function of the mass of dirty …rms. The Inada conditions assumed are su¢cient for the existence of an interior level of dirty industry employment and production.
Under symmetry, a dirty …rm's output is now given by, y = f 1=m i m i n i y = M 2 f (2=M ) n y . From the dirty good market clearing condition, c i y = c y = M y, so we have:
This dirty good market clearing condition enables us to express the dirty good demand as a linear, upward-sloping function of the induced demand for labor starting from the origin, which is referred to as the dirty good market-clearing (DM) locus (see Figure 2 ). Moreover, we can combine (26) and (15) , yielding the dirty good optimization (DO) locus:
Thus, the demand for the dirty good is independent of the induced demand for labor.
[Insert Figure 2 here] As depicted in Figure 2 , one can see that the integrated equilibrium quantity of the dirty good and employment are jointly determined at point E I .
Clean good market clearance implies:
One may easily check that one of (8), (27) and the above equation are redundant, i.e., Walras' law is veri…ed. Substituting the equilibrium n y (I) and (28) into (12), we have:
Finally, locational equilibrium (25) in this case is trivial. See Table 1 for a summary of the values of the endogenous variables at equilibrium.
Case II: Strati…ed Equilibrium
Now, we move to examine strati…ed equilibrium. At a strati…ed equilibrium, assume that the dirty …rms agglomerate in region A, and the clean …rms agglomerate in region B. Then strati…ed equilibrium is as shown in Table 1 , and we have:
Thus, we obtain the dirty good production for each dirty …rm in region A as:
In this case, wages need not be equalized between the two regions: those residing in the dirty region receive a higher wage but su¤er from pollution. The utility levels of workers in the two regions are equal. The wages in the regions A and B are w A = p(1 )f 0 (1=M ) and w B = , respectively. The dirty good market clearing condition implies:
which can be combined with (15) to yield:
By diminishing marginal utility, the above expression entails a negative relationship between dirty good price and employment (see the bottom panel of Figure 3 ). From the clean good market clearing condition, one obtains: (8) and Table 1 ,
which can again be used with (8) and (30) to verify Walras' law.
Next, we can rewrite (12) under strati…ed equilibrium as:
The equilibrium level of pollution in region A is given by:
We can derive the utility level attained by households residing in region A as:
Since there are no dirty …rms and thus no pollution in region B, in equilibrium there is no pollution tax revenue nor redistribution of dirty …rm pro…ts in region B. The utility level attained by a household residing in region B is:
We can then compute the utility di¤erence between regions A and B as:
By employing (31) and (33), we determine the strati…ed equilibrium relative price p and dirty …rm labor demand n y (S) as shown in Figure 3 . Speci…cally, from the top panel of 
Characterization of Equilibrium
Before turning to each of the two speci…c pollution tax regimes, one may compare dirty sector employment per …rm, n y (I) and n y (S), under integrated and strati…ed equilibrium, respectively.
In an integrated equilibrium, we can use the dirty good market clearing condition and the dirty good demand, (27) and (28), to derive:
In a strati…ed equilibrium, we can apply the location equilibrium condition in (33) to obtain:
where (n y ) measures the household's net surplus from consuming the dirty good.
These equilibrium relationships can be referred to as the dirty good market equilibrium loci, DE(I) and DE(S), respectively, under integrated and strati…ed con…gurations (see Figure 4 ). To establish nice su¢cient conditions for strati…cation in the next two subsections, we shall restrict our attention to a plausible scenario with n y (I) < n y (S), i.e., dirty industry employment under integration is lower than that under strati…cation. It is clear from the de…nition of (n y ) that the above scenario is more likely to arise the smaller is. In other words, for all of the results below, we shall assume that is small, a condition su¢cient to ensure that dirty industry employment under integration is smaller than under strati…cation.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Fixed Pollution Tax Regime
We examine under what conditions the strati…ed equilibrium emerges under the …xed pollution tax regime but the integrated equilibrium does not, where the pollution tax levied by the local government under the two di¤erent con…gurations is given by:
2F=M; for Case I F=M; for Case S For purposes of comparison, in the strati…ed case only one local government raises pollution tax revenue, whereas in the integrated case each local government raises the same revenue as the dirty city in the strati…ed case. One interpretation of this assumption is that the simple presence of pollution in a city is enough to trigger a tax.
We impose a regularity condition on the dirty …rm's surplus from uncompensated spillovers:
Condition R-1: (Regularity Condition on a Dirty Firm's Surplus)
Under Condition R-1, we then consider the following:
Condition S-1: (Su¢cient Condition for Strati…cation Under a Fixed Tax)
We can then establish:
Theorem 1: (Strati…ed Equilibrium) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small.
Under Condition R-1, we suppose that the …xed pollution tax is moderate so that the inequalities in Condition S-1 are met. Then the strati…ed con…guration arises as an equilibrium outcome, but the integrated con…guration does not.
Proof. The proofs of all the theorems and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Thus, under Condition R-1, Condition S-1 is su¢cient to ensure that the strati…ed con…guration is an equilibrium outcome, but the integrated con…guration is not. Intuitively, the …rst inequality of Remark 1: (Impossibility of Integrated Equilibrium) It is not di¢cult to show that when F is large enough to satisfy F > M 4 (2=M ), then dirty …rms always incur negative pro…t, implying that an integrated con…guration can never arise in equilibrium.
Remark 2: (On the Role of Agglomerative Externalities) It is important to note that despite the agglomeration force from uncompensated spillovers, the key driving force for all dirty …rms to cluster in one region (A) is the presence of a …xed pollution tax that is independent of an individual …rm's output. Speci…cally, with F = 0, it is clear that (I) > 0, implying that the integrated con…guration always arises in equilibrium. Moreover, we can compute the pro…ts under the two con…gurations as follows:
Further, assume that 1 2 e (2=M ) > e (1=M ). Then, dirty …rms will incur higher pro…t under integrated equilibrium compared to strati…ed equilibrium when the following inequality is met:
Refer to the top panel of Figure 4 . The ratio on the right-hand side of the above inequality is measured by the ratio of the lightly shaded area covering E O to the shaded area covering E I . As long as this ratio is less than
e (1=M ) (which is greater than one under the additional condition stated above), dirty …rms will earn higher pro…ts under an integrated equilibrium compared to a strati…ed equilibrium, and thus is viable whenever the strati…ed equilibrium is viable.
An important, related point is that we could accomplish our goal without any agglomeration externalities at all. Suppose that we simply used a decreasing returns technology for dirty …rms, so that they make positive pro…ts in any equilibrium without taxes. With the tax as speci…ed, for F low both integrated and strati…ed equilibria will exist, with pro…ts higher under strati…ed equilibrium. For higher F , only strati…ed equilibrium exists, as dirty …rm pro…ts are negative at integrated equilibrium. But this argument neglects an important issue. In comparing the integrated and strati…ed equilibria, there is movement along the supply curve for the dirty good due to wage di¤erences (for the compensating di¤erential from pollution), resulting in price changes and thus demand changes for the consumption goods as well. So the comparison is not that easy. Allowing for agglomeration externalities with socially constant returns actually simpli…es the analysis because the dirty good production function (inclusive of the agglomeration externality) is linear in equilibrium.
Nonetheless, once we have speci…c functional forms for the dirty good production technology, we will be able to return to this issue and provide a more concrete discussion (see Remark 7 in Section 6.1 below).
Remark 3: (On Strictly Concave Utility of the Clean Good) Suppose the utility of the clean good is strictly concave but the clean good (say, food) is more of a necessity than the dirty good in the sense that the income elasticity of demand for the clean good is lower than that of the dirty good. (In the current speci…cation, the income elasticity of the demand for clean good is, by construction, one.) Then, for a richer jurisdiction, the willingness to pay for the pollution-generating good is higher, making integration more likely to survive the equilibrium pro…tability test. That is, consideration of a more general utility function speci…cation with the clean good being more of a necessity than the dirty good reduces the likelihood of dirty …rms clustering. Thus, the presence of income e¤ects per se is not as important as the relative income elasticity of demand for the two consumption commodities.
Remark 4: (On Interregional Commuting of Workers) Recall that, in our benchmark model, at any strati…ed equilibrium, utility levels, but not wages, are equated between cities. What happens if commuting between cities is allowed? Notice that in our model all households have identical utility functions. Suppose we go to another extreme, setting commuting cost to zero. Free commuting implies that wage equalization also holds even under strati…cation. This wage equalization condition restricts the dirty …rm's pro…tability, making strati…cation less likely to emerge as an equilibrium outcome. In conclusion, su¢ciently high intercity commuting cost is necessary for dirty …rm clustering to arise in equilibrium.
Linear Pollution Tax Regime
Under the linear pollution tax regime, = t and g =
<
:
We impose a stronger regularity condition on the dirty …rm's surplus from uncompensated spillovers:
Condition R-2: (Regularity Condition on a Dirty Firm's Surplus)
Under Condition R-2, we further consider the following condition:
Condition S-2: (Su¢cient Condition for Strati…cation Under Linear Tax)
This ensures:
Theorem 2: (Strati…ed Equilibrium) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small. Under
Condition R-2, we suppose that the lump-sum component of the linear pollution tax is moderate and the marginal tax rate is not too high so that the inequalities in Condition S-2 are met. Then the strati…ed con…guration arises as an equilibrium outcome but the integrated con…guration does not.
In Section 6 below, we shall verify that both the presence of pollution and the presence of a …xed tax are crucial for a stable strati…ed equilibrium to arise.
The Case with Speci…c Functional Forms
Under the …xed pollution tax regime, we are left to check whether the strati…ed equilibrium is stable. Due to the di¢culty of examining stability in the general setting, we shall conduct our analysis under speci…c functional forms for the dirty good production technology and the subutility for the dirty good. Speci…cally, we assume that e f and u both take simple Cobb-Douglas forms: Before deriving the stability condition, it is useful to provide explicit conditions in this special case under which the strati…ed con…guration is an equilibrium outcome but the integrated con…guration is not.
Fixed Pollution Tax Regime
Under the …xed pollution tax regime with the speci…c functional forms, we can derive a su¢cient condition to ensure existence of a strati…ed equilibrium as follows:
Condition S-1 0 : (Strati…ed Equilibrium)
We can establish:
Proposition 1: (Strati…ed Equilibrium under Fixed Pollution Tax) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small, and Condition R-1 is met. Then, under a …xed pollution tax regime with Condition S-1 0 , a strati…ed competitive spatial equilibrium emerges.
We are now ready to check whether the strati…ed equilibrium is stable. Informally, stability is de…ned using small perturbations of …rms from one region to the other, checking to see whether or not they would return to their equilibrium region.
Consider,
Condition I: (Instability without Pollution Tax)
We can then obtain: 
That is, should the above inequality be met, pollution concerns are crucial for supporting the strati…ed equilibrium as a stable equilibrium con…guration. Third, Condition S-1 0 (particularly the second inequality) cannot hold when there is no …xed pollution tax (F = 0). In summary, we have shown that pollution and a …xed tax are crucial for a stable strati…ed equilibrium to arise. 10 there is still pollution, then an integrated equilibrium will arise with both wage and utility equalized but with a corner solution in consumption (only the dirty good is consumed). of equilibria, i.e. integrated versus strati…ed. Speci…cally, we set = = = 0:5, = = 1, = 0:1 and = 0:02. We can then vary the values of each of M and F from 0 to 30. As shown in Figure 5 (a), strati…cation is more pro…table than integration for lower values of M and higher values of F : the indi¤erence boundary between the two con…gurations is given byBEC. Of course, a con…guration can be supported only under positive pro…t, which is met for the area under ] AES in the case of strati…cation and for the area under ] OEI in the case of integration. Thus, a strati…ed equilibrium arises in the area of OAEB (shaded with horizontal lines) whereas an integrated equilibrium emerges in the area of BEID (shaded with vertical lines). We now set F = 5 and vary the measure of dirty …rms, M . As long as M > 1:60, a nondegenerate equilibrium exists where …rms earn su¢cient pro…ts to pay for the pollution tax. Over the range M 2 (1:60; 12:42), the equilibrium con…guration is strati…ed and the fraction of dirty …rms in city A is one. As …rms continue to enter, the equilibrium con…guration becomes integrated and the fraction of dirty …rms in city A drops to 1 2 . This is depicted in the bifurcation diagram, Figure 5 (b). 11 [Insert Figures 5(a,b) here]
The intuition behind the equilibrium con…guration of …rms under various parameter values is as follows. At moderate levels of …xed tax cost F , if there are few dirty …rms M , they must cluster together to be able to pay the tax. However, as the number of dirty …rms increases, enough pro…t is generated to allow them to separate into halves and a¤ord to pay the tax out of pro…ts. Although they could conceivably generate even more pro…t if they strati…ed, the missing items are the level of pollution and the wage. With many dirty …rms, the level of pollution in a strati…ed con…guration is high, so the wage rate must also be high to attract workers, and this makes such a con…guration impossible. For other parameter values that we have not discussed, for example if the number of dirty …rms is low but the …xed tax cost is moderate or high, the dirty …rms will all shut down even with the Inada condition on utility. If they all produce just a little, pro…ts are insu¢cient to pay the tax. producer rent. Let us examine how the magnitude of would a¤ect the result by looking at the two inequalities in Condition S-1 0 separately:
It is clear that higher (lower producer rent and lower magnitude of externality) implies that the …rst inequality of the strati…cation condition is less likely to hold. Both the left hand side and the right hand side of the second inequality are, however, lower and the net e¤ect on the likelihood of strati…cation is thus ambiguous. For su¢ciently high (for example, taking the extreme case as ! 1), the …rst inequality always fails to hold while the second always holds. Intuitively, as the region-speci…c agglomeration externality diminishes, dirty …rms will have less incentive to cluster. However, when becomes too high, dirty …rms can never generate enough rent to cover …xed costs regardless of the underlying con…guration (integration versus strati…cation). This is because we cannot separate the role of the agglomerative externality from producer rent. 12 We can further resort to our numerical example, presented in Remark 6 above, to discuss how equilibrium classi…cation changes in response to .
[Insert Figure 6 As increases, the range of F that can support a nondegenerate competitive spatial equilibrium (namely one with positive dirty good production and …nite relative prices) narrows. We can also reproduce the bifurcation diagram 5(b) in Figure 6 (b): it indicates that, given the benchmark values F = 5 and M = 12:571, the equilibrium con…guration is strati…ed over the range 2 (0; 0:5000); the equilibrium con…guration turns integrated when 2 (0:5000; 0:7220), and only a degenerate competitive spatial equilibrium (with no dirty good production and in…nite relative price) exists when continues to rise, exceeding 0:7220. 1 2 In order to separate these two channels (producer rent and magnitude of externality), one must give up social constant returns, assuming instead social decreasing returns: e f n i y (j); N i y = [n i y (j)] 1 [N i y ] 2 ; > 0, 1 ; 2 2 (0; 1) and 1 + 2 < 1. We have tried this but lost analytic tractability.
Remark 8: (On Endogenous Choice of Production Technologies) In the benchmark economy, we have followed an Arrow-Debreu convention by assuming that producers are endowed with speci…c technologies for producing particular goods. One may inquire what happens if producers are allowed to make an endogenous choice of production technologies (clean versus dirty). Consider the model modi…ed so that a potential producer can choose between clean and dirty good production, followed by location choice and then production. Then the value of being a clean good producer (zero pro…t) must be equal to the value of being a dirty good producer, implying: max f (I); (S)g = 0, where Recall from our discussion of the bifurcation diagram that as M rises, (e) e would increase in e and hence (2=M )) 2=M would become more likely to dominate (1=M ) 1=M . Using this property and manipulating (see the Appendix), we arrive at:
This is familiar from the monopolistic competition literature with endogenous entry of …rms, as in the work by Melitz (2003) . While one may impose constraints in various ways to determine the equilibrium outcome, a land requirement is natural in our economy (as proposed by Helpman, 1998) . Suppose there is a …xed land requirement for all households and …rms, each at an inelastic unit normalized to one (which can be justi…ed as an equilibrium outcome as in Berliant, Peng and Wang, 2002) . Consider the public land ownership structure delineated in Fujita (1989, pp. 60-61) 13 with a total supply of L > 2 in the entire local economy. Then the total land demand is: 2 + M (clean …rms of mass one + dirty …rms of mass M + households of mass one). It is straightforward 1 3 The public land ownership model features land rent collections that are refunded equally to all inhabitants of a location. to see that the necessary and su¢cient condition for the strati…ed con…guration to arise as the only equilibrium outcome is:
The above inequalities can be manipulated to yield (see the Appendix):
which can hold true only if
The latter inequality is satis…ed when is su¢ciently small (i.e., with a su¢ciently strong spillover externality). Given Condition (37), then Condition (36) ensures that the equilibrium is strati…ed.
This condition requires that (i) the …xed payment F is not too large (otherwise, too many …rms must cluster, implying that land demand exceeds land supply) and (ii) land supply is not too large (otherwise, even an integrated equilibrium can be supported). Notice that neither the …rms' nor the households' optimization problems change with the introduction of the land market. This is because, for producers, the same amount of land rent is added and subtracted from pro…ts, whereas for consumers the same amount of land rent is added to both sides of the budget. In short, adding endogenous technology choice by allowing potential producers choose between clean and dirty good production would not alter our main …ndings once we introduce a simple land market under public ownership with an appropriate land supply satisfying Condition (36).
Linear Pollution Tax Regime
We turn next to examining the case of a linear pollution tax. Consider, Condition S-2 0 : (Strati…ed Equilibrium)
We now have:
Proposition 3: (Strati…ed Equilibrium under Linear Pollution Tax) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small, and Condition R-2 is met. Then, under a linear pollution tax regime with Condition S-2 0 , a strati…ed competitive spatial equilibrium emerges.
Can Pareto Optimum Be Price Supported?
Since individuals are ex ante identical, we restrict our attention to within-region-equal-treatment Pareto optimum in the sense that all households within a given region reach an identical indirect utility level and consume the same bundle. Such a Pareto optimum must satisfy the following constraints:
where the …rst two equations specify production technologies, the third gives labor material balance and the population identity, and the last represents commodity material balance. Such Pareto optima are found by solving the following optimization problem:
and the above technology and material balance constraints.
We consider equilibria with linear taxes in the next two subsections.
Remark 9: (Pareto Optimal Con…guration) It is natural to inquire at this point whether, for given parameters, the Pareto optimum features an integrated or strati…ed con…guration. Indeed, although it is not central to our analysis, in general it depends on the comparison of utility from dirty good production and pollution damage in a region with half or all of the dirty …rms. In our quasi-linear setting, it amounts to u(2f (2=M )) f (2=M ) for an integrated con…guration compared with u(f (1=M )) f (1=M ) for a strati…ed con…guration.
Case I: Integrated Optimum
At an integrated optimum, we have all interior allocations. We can establish:
Theorem 3: (Equilibrium Support of Integrated Con…guration) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small, and Condition R-2 is met. Then, the Pareto optimum with an integrated con…guration can be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium under the following marginal tax rate: = f1 + 2 = [ f 0 (2=M )]g 1 .
Intuitively, the higher the pollution damage (captured by larger ) is, the greater the marginal pollution tax will be.
Case II: Strati…ed Optimum
At a strati…ed optimum, we have: k A = m B = 0. We can establish:
Theorem 4: (Suboptimality of Strati…ed Equilibrium) Consider a local economy in which pollution production is not too severe and pollution disutility is not too high, in other words is su¢ciently small, and Condition R-2 is met. Then, a strati…ed competitive spatial equilibrium is suboptimal with over-employment and over-production in the dirty goods sector relative to the strati…ed Pareto optimum.
Thus, a strati…ed equilibrium can never reach Pareto optimality by means of a linear pollution tax (which encompasses Pigouvian taxation). In fact, the equilibrium employment in the dirty sector under the strati…ed con…guration is always too large, implying that dirty goods and pollution are both over-produced. Such an over-polluting equilibrium outcome can never be corrected by a linear pollution tax.
To understand the result, it is best to refer to Figure 7 , where we plot the downward-sloping after-tax MPL locus in the top panel and repeat the locational equilibrium diagram (the top panel of Figure 3 ) in the bottom panel of Figure 7 . A high marginal tax will shift down the after-tax MPL locus without altering any other curves. Thus, the only change is the corresponding reduction in the dirty industry wage, w A . As long as w A > still holds after the tax increase, the lower wage will be fully o¤set by the tax and pro…t redistribution, keeping consumers in region A as well o¤ as before the tax increase. This is equivalent to saying that although dirty good demand is elastic, dirty good supply is perfectly inelastic. As a result, dirty good employment and production in strati…ed equilibrium remain at levels higher than the respective optimum quantities, regardless of the linear pollution tax levied.
[Insert Figure 7 here] Another way of interpreting our welfare results is as follows. The same number of distortions and tax instruments are available no matter the equilibrium con…guration of …rms, so that one would expect that Pareto optimum would be either supportable or unsupportable with prices and taxes independent of the equilibrium con…guration. However, the integrated Pareto optimal con-…guration has the unique feature that it is symmetric across locations, so the distortion associated with migration is not present. Thus, one fewer instrument is needed to support the integrated con…guration, in contrast with the strati…ed con…guration.
In the conventional literature, Pigouvian taxes (a special form of a linear tax without the lumpsum component) need not work in practice due to the di¢culty of computing marginal damages at the optimum (Baumol 1972) , or when …rms have monopoly power so that they can transfer the tax burden (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975) , or when oligopolistic …rms have dynamic strategic interactions (Benchekroun and Van Long 1998), or when lobbying groups care about the distribution of income in political games (Aidt 1998) ). In our paper, assuming away all of these issues, we show that even a generalized Pigouvian tax as proposed by Carlton and Loury (1980) cannot restore …rst best under a static, competitive environment, when we allow locational choice with endogenous clustering.
Whereas the linear pollution tax cannot correct equilibrium ine¢ciency, it should be noted that an appropriate redistribution scheme may do the job. In particular, consider a lump-sum redistribution from polluted region A to clean region B. This induces U to shift down and hence equilibrium employment in the dirty industry to fall. Thus, as long as is not too large, there exists an appropriate level of such a redistribution to support the Pareto optimal level of dirty industry employment as an equilibrium.
Concluding Remarks
In this work, we have shown how a …xed charge component of a tax system can cause agglomeration of polluting …rms as an equilibrium phenomenon. We have also established that whereas an integrated Pareto optimum can be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium with a linear pollution tax, a strati…ed Pareto optimum cannot. Regardless of the linear pollution tax schedule, a strati…ed equilibrium is always over-polluted compared to the optimum. To support the strati…ed Pareto optimum, however, an e¤ective (but practically not implementable) policy prescription is to redistribute the pollution tax revenue from the dirty to the clean city residents. Such a policy will induce migration to the clean city, thereby reducing production of the dirty good and thus of pollution.
In this paper, we have considered only equilibrium con…gurations that are completely strati…ed in terms of production or that are completely integrated in that production is symmetric across locations. One may inquire whether other con…gurations may emerge in equilibrium. The answer is positive: it is possible that one city is mixed with both clean and dirty industries present, whereas another has only the clean industry. In this con…guration, clean industry workers must have equal utility across locations and all workers must have the same wage in the city with mixed industries.
Under the Ricardian technology where clean workers are paid an exogenously …xed wage, the two equalization conditions can be met only in knife-edge cases. It is therefore innocuous to ignore this partially integrated con…guration. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: A condition su¢cient to show that the strati…ed con…guration is an equilibrium but the integrated con…guration is not is:
That is, the dirty …rms only operate under strati…cation. From (29) and (32), in turn, we need the following inequality condition: Proof of Theorem 2: In this case, the pro…ts generated by each dirty …rm under integrated and strati…ed con…gurations become:
Similar to the …xed tax case, here is a su¢cient condition to ensure that the strati…ed con…guration is an equilibrium but the integrated con…guration is not:
which can be rewritten as the following inequalities: whereas dirty …rm employment in strati…ed equilibrium must satisfy:
Substituting these into Condition S-1 gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the strati…ed equilibrium is not stable. We have deviation of dirty …rms of positive measure " moving from A to B, receiving joint pro…t given by:
From the clean and dirty …rms' …rst-order conditions for pro…t optimization, we have:
Combining these expressions, we obtain:
p~ Thus, the per deviating …rm pro…t can be computed as follows:
Recall that the pro…t of a …rm that doesn't deviate is:
To ensure stability, we therefore need: lim "!0~ < A , which holds trivially as lim "!0~ = 1.
It remains to check that the Romer positive externality alone cannot lead to stable dirty …rm agglomeration. This is equivalent to showing that, with F = 0, > A which requires: Straightforward manipulations of the free entry condition using the de…nition of , the speci…c functional form for the dirty good production technology and the population identity imply:
Substituting the above expression into the n y (S) equation, we obtain:
which can be manipulated to derive the expression for M (S) in Remark 8.
Given a total supply of L > 2 in the entire local economy and one unit inelastic demand for land by each household and producer, the necessary and su¢cient condition for the strati…ed con…guration to arise as the only equilibrium outcome can be manipulated to yield:
or Condition (36), which can hold true only if Condition (37) is met.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Under a linear pollution tax, it is easily veri…ed that the su¢cient condition S-2 becomes Condition S-2 0 .
Proof of Theorem 3: Upon substituting out the production technologies, this problem can be solved by setting up the Lagrangian as follows:
where U , N , X and Y are Lagrange multipliers associated with the utility constraint and labor and goods material balance constraints, respectively. Since k A and m B are zero under a strati…ed con…guration, we must derive the Pareto optimum under each con…guration separately.
The …rst-order conditions with respect to the 4 consumption and the 4 labor variables are given by: Under an integrated con…guration, we have: N A = N B = 1 2 , n A y = n B y = n y and n x = 1 M n y . From (A1) and (A2), we must have the same consumption bundles across the two locations. Using (A4) and (A5) then yields:
Combining (A4) and (A6), we obtain:
Both consumptions are identical to the equilibrium ones. Substituting (A8) into (A3) implies:
By setting n y in the equilibrium captured by (34) and in the Pareto optimum captured by (A9) equal to one another, one obtains:
which can be manipulated to derive the marginal tax rate given in the statement of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4: At a strati…ed optimum, we have: k A = m B = 0, together with the following 6 …rst-order conditions: 
in conjunction with two corner labor allocations: n A x (i) = n B y (i) = 0. Manipulations similar to those in the proof of Theorem 3 above give (A1) and (A2) -so consumption bundles must still be the same across the two locations -together with: Under a strati…ed con…guration, we have: n A x = n B y = 0, n A y = n y , N A = M n A y , N B = 1 M n A y , and n B x = n x = 1 M n y . Whereas clean good consumption still takes the same form as in (A7), (A4) and (A6) together yield: 
